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Abstract
We Maly,e a model of overlapping generalions in which clean air, "pil,e public gomt
;, used as a privale input into pr<.xluelion. Altho"gh production exhibit' con'lanl ,elUrn,
10 ,cale, endogenou, growth can OCCUl', In a laissez-fair<: e<luilibriuEll. firm, generate
rem, tha. are 'be vah'e ()f IJW pdhni<)n they create. These rent, crowd out investment
and s.low economic growth. S"ch m1 '''1uitibrium may nor SUpp0rl Pareto optimal
allocatiOn>. but a l';g<mvifin lax doc'_ Hence, a pollll(ion tax can yield a dQuble dividend
because;t reduces pollution and ;nerea,;,\~ growth,
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1. INTRODUCTION
What limits w economic growth does a concern for the environment entail?
The popuillf press oilen implies that growth caus~-s environmental degrada
tion. Some authors emphasi?-\~ that p<>Jlution is an inexorable by-product of
industriali;.ation and that increasing matcrial affillcnc(; will cntail a decreas
ingly attractive world. Views like these were fuelled by the gloomy piclure
presented in Meadows et at.·s (1972) The Limits to Growth. Others claim that
countries imposing high environmental standards spur research in p.)l!\uion
abatement, develop human capital, and increase growth. Indeed, Ihc World
Bank's (1992) repol1 Development and rhe Environment emphasizes that care
for thc biosphere will require economlc growth and that growth cannot lake
place in a deteriorating environment.
The purposc of this papcr is to show that approprillte environmental
policies might acmally spur growth. Economists often lhiM of a dean
cnYironment as a luxury. Thus, as a country becomes richer, its citizcns
demand that grcDler allenlion be paid to thc habitat, and thcy are willing to
impose environmental taxcs and regulations as public fXllicy, The model
presented below shows that these taxes and regulDlions might actually pay a

'double dividend'. This bonus arises through a mechanism that has been
overlooked: an cnvironmental tax dissipates the renlS associated with
pollution and mitigates the extent to which they crowd out investment. I
The model we use builds Oil the lVork of Fishcr (1992), who diseusses the
general properties of an overlapping generations model with constant returns
to scale. Hc shuws l.hal I.Ill' assumpli\lu \If linile ljves lllakes it He",essary fvr
the current price of an investment good to decline liS the economy grows.
Hence, if agents do nol live forever, growlh cannot occur in a one-sector
economy, and a two··sector 1Il0del describes the asymptotic behaviour of a
wide class of growing economies.
We utili7.e the model of overlllpping generations since it lends itself
nalllr'<llly to the analysis of the effects of governments' environmental policies
when agents' actions have wnsequenees that endure beyond their own
lifetimes. Severallluthors have analysed similar issues. MouffilOuras (1993)
sllldies a model of renewable resources and shows that equilibrium may entail
perpetually declining standards of living. Using a model with finitely many
generllliDns, Howarth (1991) explores the trade-off between economic
efficiency and sodal equity in a model with exhaustible resources. Howarth
and Norgaard (1992) argue that sustainable economic developmcnt is
essentially a matter of inter-genenltiollill equity. We show that this issue, in
the guise of the distribution of pollmion rights, has important effects for
economic growth and thus innuences the welJ-being of those not yet born.
We demonstrate that Pigouvian pollution taxes with compensating lump
sum transfers can represent a Pareto improvement over the laissez-faire
('quilibrium, Ballna (l990) argues that it is not realistie to assume thal a
government has this kind of wll!l'ol in a dynamic eeonomy. Still, we dcscribe
a simple mle that ean be impiemell1ed in part by using publicly available
information: the government should compensate the owners of firms for the
(:apitallosses arising from pollution taxes. There is no simple rule for these
taxes because the public's willingness to pay for pollutinn abatement may
dep<md, in general, upon intaest rates and the profile of aggregate income,
The seeond seetion describes t.he model and i1s laissez-faire equilibrium.
The third analyses properties of this laissez..faire equilibrium and its
inetliciendes. These distortions arise because environmental externalities
have not been internalized. The fOllrth section analyses a dynamic profile of
Pigouvian taxes and shows thm such taxes, coupled with II sequence of lump
sum transfers, can email a Pareto improvement ovcr the laissel-faire
cquilibrium, The Ilflh section presents a simple analytical example, while the
sixth presents our conclusions.

2. HIE MODEl. AND ITS LAISSEZ·FAIRE EQUILIBRIUM
There is an infinite sequence of generations with onc person born in each
period. TIle ini1ial 'old' agent lives fot only one period, but every other person

lives for two periods. We shall use the convention that a subscript refers to
a dated commodity and a superscript to an agent We assume that the
population and labollr force are constant, although our results generalize
easily when population growth is exogenous.
The initial generation is endowed with the economy's stock of capital, and
every other person is endowed with L units of labour in the first period of his
life and nothing else. This description of endowments shows that the path of
the ecollomy describes per capita economic growth. Also, a worker must save
part of his wage to finance consumption in old age.
We model poHution as a pure public consumption good that is a private
input into production. Just as labour is leisure used as an input. so is pollution
clean air used in production. The amount of clean air in the (X:onomy is in
limited supply in every period. A finn's use of clean air is reflected in its
production technique, and one finn's inputs cannot be ust'-d by another,
Aggregate environmenwl degradation is detemlined by the produclion
decisions of all finns in the economy,
Finns' production decisions give lise to a pollution profile described by
5=(5),S2"")

a uniformly bounded sequence. This description of thc cnvironment is quite
gencral. This spccifiemion can entail a declining, constant, or increasing but
bounded flow of dean air per period. The long-run characteristics of the
environment and Ihe production processes will be described by the limiting
behaviour of this sequcnce. Although wc have not given an explicit Jaw of
motion for d~41n air, Ihe reader can think of this sequence as a reduced fonn
fnr a more complicated dynamic ~pecifkation.
Let c';be agent h'~ consumption at time I. Then preferences are represemed
by the utility functions: u°(c~, -SI) for Ihc original generation and u'(c;, c;... ,
""8,, -SHI) for the gencration I > O. These functions are increasing in caeh of
their arguments, showing that agents care about their own consumption and
the disutility they ~uffer from [X!lIution during the course of their lives. Note
Ihal agellls in gencnttious t - I and r suffer disutiJity from S" the aggregate
amount of clean air used by all /inns in period r. Thus, clean air is a pure
public good, and aggregate pollution is global, not local.
There are two sectors in Ihe economy, ellch sector with a cominuum of
firms. Firms in sector I produce /inal goods and services, and those in sector
2 produce imermediate investment goods. The production function for finn
j E !O,1J in sector i € {I ,21 is
Qt.iU) "" F,(K,./j), L,}J), 5,))))

where K,}j) is the /inn's input of capiwl, L,,;{j) is that of labour, and 5",(i)
is that of clean air used as an input, or pollution emilled, all at lime t. We will
assume that each production function is homogeneous of degree one in its
inputs and is weakly increasing in each of its arguments; thus there are no

increasing returns to scale, nor is there exogenous K'Chnical progress.
Economic growth occurs because of capital accumulation, but one need not
think of the second sector simply as producer durable goods. Instead, one
might consider capital as Iln aggregate reprodudbl.c factor who;;e private and
sodal rales of return do not differ. We assumc constant returns to scale in each
sector in order to isolate the effects of pollution as a negative extcrnality in
t.he growth process. Moreover, recent empirical studies do not support the
hypothesis of increasing returns; see Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991) or
Mankiw eI a1. (1992).
f<:ach type of firm in each sector creates a fixed amount of pollution in each
period. Let f1i(j) be a stationllry measure describing the distribution of firms
in sector i E (I ,2). Then the aggregate flow of pollution created in each period

" S, '" JS,.) (j) dftl + JS,.2 (j) dl-l2
where each integral is taken over the relevant support and dfl.; denotes the
obvious density. Each firm creates an infinitesimal amount of pollution, but
Jlrms create a negalivc cxt.ernality in the aggregate. A firm's pollution is
exactly analogous to the role of land in Ricardo's theory of rents. In panicular,
jjrms' choices of capitlll and labOlIT a.re determined on the intensive margin,
whereas which particular jjrms operate is determined on the extensive margin.
Also, since the production functions are linearly homogeueous, if clean air is
a necessary inrn!, then a firm experiences decrea:;ing returns to scale in
capital and labour, the marketed factors of production.
It is important (0 describe the pattern of ownership of the firms bccause
they generate rems. We will assume that the initial genenllion own:; the
cconomy's emire stock of equity in all finns in period 1. Hence, agent t? I
will save some of his wage, invest in new capital, and pure,hase equity. This
process repealS itself in each period, as the older gencration divest, it:;clf of
equity and the young use savings to purchase the investment good and equity
in both kinds of firms. In the absence of a pollution tax, the 'dividend' from
having purchased a finn in period t is the value of its output that is attributed
to the use of clean air in period t + 1.
The law of motion for capital is KI+ 1 "" Qt,:) (j) dl-l2, where we are
implicit.ly assuming lhat capita] depreciates completely in cach perjod; this
assumption undcrscores the notion thatll period corresponds to the economic
life of Il worker. Of course, the economy satisties the resource constraints

J

JK',I (j) djll + JKt,2 (j) d[lz:;; K,

and

ht,1 U) dl1'l + JL,,2 (il dftl s: l.

We are now in a position to describe the decisions of lirms ,IUd consumers,
Let p,,! be the present price of a clilim against the good i E {1,2), W, be the
analogous price of labour, and R, be (he analogous rentals ratc. We use the
nonnalil.alion that PI.! "" 1; hence, I-',./I-"'IJ is a commodity's own rate of
interest, and P,,/P,.I is the currem pllee of Iln investment good.

A finn's accounting profits at time l are n"i (j) '" P',iQU (j) "'. R,Kf.i (il"
W,L", (j). In each period, a finn takes prices as given and chooses inputs to
maximize profit~. Of course, since eac,h production function is linearJy
homogeneous, a firm's accounting profits are the rents that accrue to its use
of clean air. Since there is a continuum of firms, shutting down anyone firm
wiJI entail a complete capital loss for its owners but will have no effect on
aggregate poJ1ulion.
The value of a finn in $edot i at the end of time r is V,.; (j) '" ~ H s,; (j),
00

s~t

where we have imposed a 'no-bubbles' condition on the asset markets. 11lns
a finn's equity is equal to the present value of the rems it generates from the
pollntion it creale~, Shares are sold ex diyidend, and the present value of a
firm's equity satisfies V,,; (j) "" V'+l,i (j) 'f H,., (j), the familiar condition till\!
a sharc of stock is worth the present value of the sum of dividends and
expectf~l capital gains. Thus, profit maximilJltion in each period is equivalent
to choo~ing a production plan that maximil.e~ the value ofequity at each point
in time, taking the use of clean air as given.
Let Vr,; "" VI., (j) dtt, be the present value of the equity in industry i '" {I,ll.
Then the present value of agent h's income is yO "" R1K) + I V 1J and y' '"'

i

,

i~1

W,L for t > O. Agent 0 has income accruing from the ownership of the initial

capital stock and the econotuy's stock of equity. Any other agent COJIilllllllds
the discounted value of labour income, Taking prices as given, each chooses
a consumption plan and as~et holdings subject to his present..value wealth
constraint. He uses claims on ctipitalllnd shares of eqnity (l~ ~tores of value
to finance consumption in the final period of his life.
Let Q" "" Q, j (j) dll;. Then, taking each finn's pollution profile as given,
a perfect 'foresight la.issez-faire equilibrium is a li~t of prices and corre~p(lnd
ing aggregate quantities

i

{(P"I,PO,Wt,R')}";~l

and

{(Q,,:,Q,.2))";",j

satisfying six conditions, First, each consumer choo~es Ilsset holdings lind a
consumption profile to maximize utility, taking as exogenous the stream of
pollution he faces during his life. Second, firnls maximize profits period by
period, again taki.ng lheir use of dean air as givcn, Third, thc economy's
resource constraints are satisfied. Founh, matcrials balances hold. Fifth, assct
markets dear. Sixth, the initial stock of capital and ownership of equity is
glven.
The delinition of a laissez-faire ~'quj]jbrium take~ as given an a,bitrary
pattern of pollu!.ion among all finns, This pattern mailers because it does not
assume that dean air i~ rationed efficiently. We win show below that the
asympwtic share of pollution in the investment sector is z<','fO in a gmwing
economy. Hence, the long"mn behaviour of such all economy is illfluenced
largely by the use of dean air in the consumption sector. We now turn our

attention to how the growth rale of the economy is affected when claims to
clean air have been anocated implicitly through the ownership of finn equity.

3. PROPERTIES OF THE LAISSEZ·FAlRE EQUILmRIU1\II
First, we state a result describing lhe asymptotic share of pollution in the

investment sector.
Proposilion I: If the supply of clean air is oounded, then the economy exhibits
sustained growth only if the asymptotic share of pollution in the investment
sedor is zero.
Proof: See the Appendix for the proof.

Rebelo (J99J) and Fisher (1992) have argued that it is appropriate to think
of the investment sector as the engine of gl"Owth for this economy. If the
amounl of pollution that the economy C2ll sustain is bounded, then it is
necessary for that engine to be green. The same conclusion, however, may not
be true in the consumption sector, where the asymptotic share of pollution
may be greater than r.ero.
Since capital must be strongly productive2 for this economy to grow, we
will assume henceforth that HmKt2 "", ~ IJF2 (K,,2' L,.2' 5"z)ldK,,< '" r > L
The asymptotic marginal product of capital is independent of the labour force
and the supply of dean air be.eause both arc bounded by assumption. ln
equilibrium Pu fP"1,2 is the marginal rate of transfoilllation of current into
future cllpital. This assumption about the second sector implies that
lim,,,,,,~ P'.2IP",J,2 '" r in a growing economy_ Also, in such an economy
P,,"fP,,1 '" O. Our assumption about production in the investment
lim,
sector is necessary for growth, but it is not sufficient. We need to describe the
agents' savings decisions more fully_
To that end, let us define 1 + i'+1 "" P,.JPr<l,J' the only relative price th"t
llla{{ers for savings. Then the consumer's decisious are slInunariz.ed by a
function 0' (Y', i'+l' -S" .....5 ,+1), where savings depend upon income, the real
interest rate, and the aggregate profile of environmental degradation facing
t > O. Equilibrium in the market for the investment good is expressed by

,

0' (W,L, i'+l' -S" -St+l) '" P,.2Kt+1 +

L V'+l,i

,=1

(1)

which states that agents must use claims on capital and firms' shares as stores
of value. Equation (I) states that agent t > 0 acquires full ownership of both
finns at the end of the first period of his life,
Now consider a balanced growth path. Since heterogeneous saving-s
decisions will surely complicate the analysis, we will impose that these
generations have identical preferences and drop the superscript modifying the

savings function. Then (1) Implies that such a balanced path IS characterized
by an increasing aggregate capital stock with constant physical shares
allocated to each sector. The gross rate of growth of the physical capital stock

isG",K".jIK;.
Since the production functions for the two sectors are different, they may
have disparate physical rates of growth. Bm, on a balanced path, the relative
price of the investment good offsets this differential. The consumption sector
grows fl1 the rate lim,~~ Q'+I.I/Q[.J "" G I , which depends upon the r<lte of
accumulation of capital and the profile of pollution abatement. Since lim,~
P">J.1. K"./P,.2 K, '" G/I" and the marginal propensity to save is constant,
equation (l) describes balanced growth only if lim,_>~ P,,/P"H,1 "" I"G/G.
Hence, I + i '" rGl/G is the real interest rate, and thc value shares of
consumption and investment in national income are constant.
Also, we will assume that thc asymptotic sharcs of capi{jil, labour and dean
air in the first sector are all well defined, Let these shares be BI •K , Gu . and 01,S
respectively. They may depend upon the pollution per worker generated by
that sector, but posrulating that they are well defiued is largely equivalent to
assuming thatlhe pollution generated by the consumption sector displays uo
cycles and that the production function in that soctor is othenvisc well
behaved.
Finally, since we are interested in studying balanced growth paths, it seems
innocuous enough to assume the margilllli propensity to save from permanent
income converges to a constant. We will allow this rate to depend upon the
entire profile of environmental degradation that the economy faces. Recalling
that the long-ruu renl Interest rate is a constant and that each agent's
permanent income is the present value of his wage bill, we can defiue: limt..... ~
a(W,L, if+!' "..5" "..5,." )IW,L "" Gy(i, -5), the asymptotic marginal propensity
to save. Using (I) and noting that a balanced path is characterized by constant
physical shares of capital in both sectors, we eau solve for the growth rate of
the capital stock
(2)

Now we state the following,

Proposition 2: Assume that the long-run marginal propensity to save is not
decreasing in the interest rate, Then a unique laissez-faire equilibrium exists.
and the growth rate of capital is described by (2).
Proof: See the Appendix for the proof'.
Along a balanced growth path the physical share of capital devoted to the
first sector is constant: then logarithmic differentiation of F, (K" i' L'.l' S" 1 )

shows that its growlh depends positively upon the economy's rate of capital
accumulation and negatively upon the rate of pollution abatement in the first
ser.10I. Thus, the utility of a representative generation can become arbitrarily
large ifboth G > I and the effects of environmental degradation on utility arc
not too deleterious. For any growth rates of lhe capital stock and the
consumption sector, the real interest rate adjusts so that (2) holds.
We conclude this section witb the observation that a laissez-falre equilib
rium may not support Pareto optimal allocations. Consider lhe static
efficienr.')' critcrion

,
-L

(tJuhldc~rl tJu"/aS,,,,,tJF/tJS,,J

h~,_1

Since the amount of clean air used by each finn is arbitrary, this equation may
not hold. As long as the total marginal disutility of pollution is great enough,
people will be willing to give up ,:ollsumptioll untl.! the shadow value of dean
air in production is sufficiently high. We have just shown the following,
Propositiofl 3: In a laissez-faire equilibrium, the economy may not support

Pareto optimal allocations.
4, POLLUTION TAXES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
A market for pollution rights is missing in this economy_ Since fixed amounts
of pollution are created by each firm, such rights fall by default to their
owners. Thus, firms' shares have positive value, and (1) shows that they
crowd out investment. A conventional market forp'Jllutiol1 right~ cannot exist
beeau$(' clean air is a pure public good. Thus, there is a compelling case for
II Pigouvian pollution tax.
Consider a pollution fee whose present price is A,. Then
A/P"I '" -

,
L

(;),//;)(:;,)-1

fJu"tas, "" fJF/;)S,.1

(3)

h~,_j

describes the static optimality criterion for this shadow value, Equation (3)
states that a Pigouvian tax equates the marginal willingness to pay for
pollution abatement and the marginal product of clean air. 3
If pollution almtement is a luxury, then (3) states that the current value of
dean air rises. If agents' utility functions are separahle in deiln air ~md
consumption, then (3) describes a simple wle for the imposition of the
Pigouvian pollution tax. The pollution tax is high when thc margin1l1 di~utility
of pollution is high. If pollution is necessary in the prodlWli(Jn of the
e()n~umption good, then the marginal product of clean ail" and the polllllhm
tax will become arbitrarily large.
Consider a govemment imposing pollutioll lnxe~ jAil~~I,N(lW linn

.i E{O,l]

in sector i E{I.2}has renL~ H"I (i) = p,.,Q,.i I)) - R,K", I)) "" W,Lu
(j) - A,S,,; (j). Since the input of clean air is priced explicitly, il is chosen
endogenously by lhe firm. Since each sector exhibiL~ constant returns to scale,
any film now earns zem protit~ in equilibrium. Hence, the aggregate value of
firm equity is zem. Also, the choice of inputs thai maximize profits is
independent of thc type of finn, and there is an imm<,diale increasc in lhe outpul
of both sectors liS finns switch to production techniques where all inpuL~ arc
chosen on the intensive margin. Thus, introducing po1lution taxcs increases the
level of gross national product because it rations clean air efficiemly.
Again, a perfeci foresight equilibrium is a Jist of prices and laxes and
aggregate quantities

satisfying six conditions analogous to those describing the laissez-f:lire
equilibrium. The only difference is that finns do not take their use of clean
air as given exogenously; instead the usc of clean air is dctcrmined
endogenously by the fimls' profit maximization decisions.

,

Since finns now cam no profits,

L
i~1

V'.'.I,; = 0 in each IX,riod. Thus, the

=

analogue of (1) is now (l' (W,L, iHI • -S" -5'+1) P, ,1K,+) , and II given profile
of real income and environmental degradation allows more of the reproduci
ble factor to be accumulated in each period. Also, the logic leading [0 (2)
shows th!\! the Pigouvian tax increases the economy's rale of growth most
dramatically if the asymptotic share of pollution is large. The Pigouviall taxe..,
hurt the owners of finns, but may benefit both current and future consumers.
They benefit fumre consumers in two ways. First, they increase the rate of
accumulation of capilal and thus the fumfC real wage. Second, tbey induce an
efficienl amount of pollmion in each period, Tbus, pollution laxes can indeed
yield a double dividend.
In the preeeding paragraph, we assumed implicitly that these taxes simply
created a surplus for the government budget. Thus, [he Pigol)vian taxes
essentia1ly usurp the \'l~lue of the equity owned by lhe original generation, Of
eourse, the imposition of these laxes is not necessarily a Pareto improvemenl
since it may decrease the utilily of this generation. However, there may be a
scJf"financing sequence of Jump-sum laxes that enables the government to
implement a Pareto improvement.
We will sbow how to derive such a sequence, Consider an arbitrary
distributioo of clean air ilnd a corresponding laissez-faire equilibrium {(P, "
P,,), W" R,) r:~1 and {(Qu, Q,.7.) l ~~l' Let 0.0 = u()(c~, -5,) and «' =- u'(c;,
C;+l' -5" ",.s,<-,) if I > O. where these mility functions arc evaluated at the
equilibriulJl allocations and lhe given profile of enviwnmemal degradation.
Sinee labour is supplied inelastically, the expenditure function for ugent
t>Ois4

e' {Po' P,.-I,1' -5" -51+1 ' (I.') '"

.

lnHl(c'J)

If"
.' I U '(.I
S »
'I
fjc,+ P,_"c,..)
C"C,.,.j'''"'-'''-t+!_U

,'" , ..I "
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~
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This is the minimal amount of money that agent I:> 0 needs to achieve utility
a.
Now let {ah)";,m{l describe the profile of utilities in a benchmark lai~sez
faire equiUbrium. Recall that
is the ~resent value of an agent's income.
Then the sequence {til '";e" is defined bY'

,

r

(4)

We are looking for a sequence of compensating lump-sum transfers such thai
no agem would object to leaving the laissez.. fair equilibrium with lhe
appropriate compensation. These lump-sum taxes and transfers do not
corre,spond 10 balanced budgets in every generation, Instead, they entail
nmning genenl.lional deficits to compensate those hurt by the Pigouvian taxes
and using the surpluses generated by the pollutj(Jn taxes to service the interest
burden on the national debt. This deficit crowds out "gl'Owth, btU it is less than
the value of firms' shares if their owners Me willing to pay for pollution
abatement.
The infoDnational reqniremenb needed to implement this policy are
formidable, but a good rule of thumb for the government is: (1) impose a
big tax on pollution when society'S willingness to pay for pollution
abatement is high; and (2) compensate the owners of firms for any capllal
losses that these pollution taxes entail. This technique is already in use! It
is now commonplace in the United States to charge households marginal
cost for solid waste disposal and also to compensate land·owners for capital
losses if a nt',w landfill is located ncar the site of their property. These policies
enn yield a double dividend; they help abate pollution and increase economic
growth.

5. A SIMPLE EXAMPU:
This section gives a simple parametric specification of thc model, We assume
the utility functions u(}(c~, S) = logc~ - ~SI and u'(c;, C;~I' S) '"" (l - 0)
(loge; - sS,) + O(lOgc;+l - tjlSN , ) for agent t;;: 1. TIle parameter 0 < 0 < I
denotes the marginal propensity to save from pennaoon! income. Thc
important aspect of this utility function is that the marginal willingness to p,ly
for pollution abatement can be determined in a simple way.6 Also, saVill);: p<~r
worker satisfies o(W" la!' '...S" --5/+) '" oW,. We impose Cobb-Douglj~\
productiou functions, with capital's share being unity in the invest~m gOllds
sector. These assumptions about preferences, production, and pollution lItl'
such that !he economy is on a balanced path from its first period, lind it~
asymptotic properties describe the actual equilibrium.
Using the utility function and the production function for the tirst :;.ct~u.\j,

we See timt the rule for the pricing of the pollution tax is A/P", =- 1VC;-1 +
t;c; '" 0uQu/S" where all the economy's pollution occurs in the first sector.
B
On a balanced path, the terms ill this equation grow at the rale G IX; thus the

profile of pollution is constant- The pollution tax rises at the same nlte as the
real wage.
Of COliNe, the pollutioD lax now implies that \1,..-1 "" 0 for all I + J. The
algebra leading to (2) shows that the gwwth rate now is G "" r

0'
SIX

I

+

(lOlL

an increase from the rate in a laissez-faire. equilibrium. In deriving this growth
rale, we used the fact that the govcmmcnt has a surplus of GuQ,." the entire
revenue of the pollution tax in cadi period, Since <-I IQ ,.1 '" 0l,/( + 09,,1. and
(';IQ',I =- (1 "'. ujOjJ. on a balanced path, we may conclude the constant amount
of pollution is S "" f\sf['IJ-,(O,.K + (lEl u ) +;(1 - o)OuJ Thus, steady-state
pollution is d~'Creasing in society's marginal willingness to pay for its

abatement.
Does the new growth trajectory represent a Pareto improvement? In a
laissel,-faire ~'{juilibrium, output of the consumption sector is Q, j "" [(0, /( +
al./(
0l./( ,Uu
eLL
' . '
01 ..)/(O',K+Ois+oO'.l)l
K I 5, L ,where we are assl.lmlUg an
identical distribution of pollution among the firms in the first sector: In the
equilibrium with the Pigollvian tax and a government slITplus, the analogous
au h
. A
["
I
"lOj,X
. " ,lS
output IS
!.iI" "" QIX (O'.K + (JulJ)
K 1o,.x ·,"el,S L .,were
agam.)
the optimal constant levi'! of pollution. Since the laissez..faire level of
pollution was arbitrary, this differen"e \::an represent an increase or decrease
in the output of the first sector. If the level of pollution is unchanged, output
must decrease, since fewer resources are devoted to current consumption and
more to investment. Of course, if the original equilibrium had an inefficient
distribution of pollution among firms, output may rise once the Pigouvian tax
is in place, even if the aggregate poJJution is curtailed.
Using the utility of the representative agent in the original renel'ativn,
the produetivn function in tbe first seet\!r, and the fact that c;~
(° 1,<1: +
1." + oOU)Q',l in a laissez.-faire equilibrium, we ean infer that duo/dS,
"" fl 1S/5 1 ".. li'. Thus, if the laissez"faire equilibrium had, relatively, a IN uf
pollution, the original generation's utility is increasing in pollution
abatement. Hence, a sufllcient condition for improying the welfare of the
original generation is that its marginal willingness to pay for pvllution
abatement in the laissez·faire equilibrium must be high, Finally, we note
tbat this eondi~on al~o suffices for the welfare of every generation to rise,
since <-I"" G lX"'" )c~. Of course, the parameter li' must be sufficiently
large so that an initial (finite) string of generations prefer the equilibrium
with lower pvllution and higher investment.
"What about an equilibrium with national debt? The pricing of the pollution
tax is exactly as in the example with the govemmcm surplus, and again the

°
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pollution tax implies that V'+I '" 0 for all I + L Consider first the case where
all firms are identical and lire producing the optimal level of pollution S, Then
the laissez"faire equilibrium was already Pareto optimal, and moving to the
Pigouvian equilibJium entails no increase in the static efficiency of the
economy. In lIlis case, we set to '" VI for the initial generation aud.' '" 0 for
every other agent I > O. Thus, the equilibrium with national debt replic"tes lIle
miginal (efficient) laissel."faire equilibrium. Firms in lIle economy usc lIleir
erstwhile dividends to pay the new pollution tax, the government uses these
revenues to amortize the national debt, and governmcnt bond~ serve the same
role as a store of value as did finn equity in the original equilibrium.
Now consider im economy in which half the consumption finns create no
pollulion and the other half created 25. Of coursc, the finns lIlat do not pollute
would not be profitable, and their decisions on lIle cxtensive margin would
keep them out of business. In the equilibrium with a pollution tax, new firms
enter the first sector and output expands there. Since the aggregate amount of
pollution is unchanged, it satisfies the oplimality criterion, but thcre is an
immediate increase in output and no resources are drawn away from the
investment sector. This gain allows the government to set ,0 < V" and again
it can put,' '" 0 for every other agent t > 0, Hence, there is less national debt
and an incipient increase in the growth rate, benefiting all current and future
generations. Again finns in the economy use their fonnCT dividends to pay Ihe
pollution tax, and claims against the national debt have II competitivc return.
Btlt, on a balanced growth path, the present value of lIle pollution taxes is
OS) \f,.1 f"/(f" .... G), I\-'hich is greater than V, and is also increasing in the
growth rate. Since the pollution lax creates an incipient rise in growth, the
government Clm amortiz(; tht, national debt in finitely many periods! Then, the
ccollomy will be on a balanced growth path described by the case where it
runs perpetual surpluses. Heuce, the same sufficient conditions for a Pareto
improvement hold .in this case.
We have demonstrated that il is stltliciem that the owners of finus have a high
marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement for the equilibrium with a
Pigouvian tax to cITe>:t a Pareto improvement.. Also, even if the aggregate
amount of pollutiou is not excessive, the pollution tax will >:anse a Pareto
improvement if there is an initil,lly inctJlcient distribution of pwduction. Hence
we toncJude that a pollution tax >:an increase growth, finance parl ofthe national
debt, and improve the welfare of every generation in the economy.

6. CONCLUSIONS
We have desaibed a mude! with endogenous growth where the environment
is a pure public good that is used as a private input into production. In a
laissez.. faire equilibrium, lIle owners of finns reap rents Ihat arc the entire
prcsent value of the stream of pollution that their finns generate. Even though
there is no technological progress, Ihis economy can exhibit sustained growth

jf the marginal propensity to save is high and if these rents do not represent
a large share of national income. It is also necessary that the asymptotic share
of pollution in the investment goods sector be zero. This sector represents, in
a broad sense, a reproducible factor of production whose priva.te and social
rates of return are equal. One need not think of the investment sector as heavy
industry.
Any pollution tax increases the rate of economic groWtJl and the current
level of outpm because it dissipates the rcnts that crowd out the accumulation
of capital and rations the use of dean air efficiently. A poJ!ution tax will lower
the welfare of the owners of finns, so that there may be a need to compensate
them. Deciding on the correct profile of Pigouvian taxes is quite a daUllling
task because it entails Judging the marginal benefit of pollution abatement for
each agent of infinitely many generations. If a suitable policy cau be
implemented, it entails an intHitive profile of national debt: the govemment
nJns a deficit tn C(lmpensMe the current owners of firms and amortizes the
national debt from the future receipts of pollution taxes. Hence, an ccouomy
can grow and still be green, and its government can compensate those who
suffer from pollUlion taxes. Such a policy lK'"Cd not increase the present value
of the nlltional debt if it is implemented appropriately.
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APPENDIX

Proof of Proposilion I: Since the supplies of both clean air and labour are
bounded, the economy displays sustained growth only if there is an t > 0 such
that

I

.1'£

f

< K,+I!K, "" F2 (Kt.2v), L,,2V), Sov)) d!J,JK,

f

Letting K',2 "" K,.2V) d!-':l and using the fact that K,.2
I +e

s: K"

we may infer

d Ko(i)lFl(K,.zU), L,.JU), S',"l.V))! K"zV)] d!J,J/ Ko

where uow we are integrating over the set of finns that nse strictly positive
amounts of capital. The term in square brackets is the average pwduct of

capital, and it is decreasing in the stock of capital. Using L'H6pital's nile and
!cuing limk, 2"~ ilF7.(K,.2' L,,~, S,,~)idK,.~ "" I", we have
I +E<I" JK"zV)dtt/K',2",r
The result then follows from the linear homogeneity of the production
function. This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposilion 2: leI the shares in the fint sector be fl,.K' 9 1,1. and flu"
as in the text. We can now calculale the limiting value of equity on a balanced
path. Since G < r, tlms

L

P',2K",] is hounded, But then {V'+I,::d:~1

'~I

converges to zero at a faster rute than the other terms in (1) because lhe
asymptotic share of pollution in the investment goods sector is 7-ero. Also,
since I + i '" G] riG,

L

p,., Q,.I is hounded too. Then the recursive formula

'~I

for the present price of equity implies that lim,---.=Val,jiP,.IQ',1 '"
°s,ICI(r-G).

We can now calculate the growth rate implicitly_ Rewrite the left-hand side
of (1) as W,w(W,L, ;,+] , ·"S" -S'+I )/W,L, Since the labour force is fixed, the
savings function satisfies
lim,--->~ o(W,L, i al ,

-S" -S,+, )iW,L '" 0r(i, ,,,,S)

where we have used L'Hopital's rule. Also, we use the fact that the limiting
present value of the wage bill is zero and we are allowing this function to
depend upon the entire profile of pollution. Then (J) implies that
(AI)

which describes the growth rate ofthecapital stock implicitly. The right-hand
side of (Al) is a monotonically increasing function of G. Its greatest lower
bound is 0, and it has no upper lxmnd as G tends towards the ma1l:imal feasible
growth nile r. Also, as long as higher interest rates do not decrease savings
for any S, the left..hand side of (AI) docs not increase in G, since I + i '"
G1r/G and the physical shares of capital in cach sector are constant on 11
balanced path. This completes the proof.

NOTES
I

2
3

'n,;, r~sult ,t~nd! in cunll'ast to lhe wurk of Bovenherg and de Mooij 0994), who
argue thai p"nul;olJ ta1l:es typically ~,~ucerbMe ,t"tic «;uoom;c distortions, and 10 that
of van del Ploeg and Wit!lagen (1991), who find that concern f"r the envir<:mmelJt
lowers oatput in" traditional n~>{}ClaOl<icRI growth modeL
This is the terminology of Gale and Sutherland (l%8).lt enta;l~ thai the investment
sector ;, bolh linear homogelJem" ~nd di,plays a ,uffieiently high mm-ginal eflic;~,ncy
of ;nvest1ncnt SO thai the economy's c~p;ta] stock may oc'Come arbitrarily large.
This tax j~ q"ite similar to Ihal described in Diamond (1 '173)..

4
5
fl

Ttl(', function 10.- ag<mt 0 is analogous.
Of cour;;e, the expressio" for ag~mtO is t" ",eo (I', "S" u")- yO.
Aho, since this function is separable, the profile of"pollution la~es avoids the dynamic
myopia thot Strotz ( 1956) describe. for more general preferences.
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